Babe: The Tale of the Speaking Meat - Part I by Plumwood, Val
 21 




 'You look a little shy: let me introduce you to that leg      
 of mutton,' said the Red Queen.  Alice-Mutton:   Mutton-
 Alice'. The leg of mutton got up in the dish and made a 
 little bow to Alice, and Alice returned the bow, not 
 knowing whether to be frightened or amused. 
  'May I give you a slice?' she said, taking up the a  slice?' 
she said, taking up the knife and fork, and  looking from one 
Queen to the other. 
 'Certainly not,' the Red Queen said, very decidedly: 'it 
 isn't  etiquette to cut anyone you've been introduced to. 
 Remove the joint!'  
    




 1.  The Unprejudiced Heart 
 2.  The Paradox of the Speaking Meat 
 3.  The Communicative Model 
 
Part 11     - in next issue of this journal 
 
 4.  Communication and Anthropomorphism 
 5.  Meat and the Colonising Contract    
 
 
1 : The Unprejudiced Heart   
I would like somebody somewhere to endow an annual prize for a work 
of art which takes a group of the most oppressed subjects and makes an 
effective and transformative representation of their situation. The work 
would make its audience care about what happens to those oppressed 
subjects and to understand something of the audience's own role in 
maintaining their oppression. It would foster recognition of the 
subjectivity and creativity of the oppressed group and consciousness of 
the need for redistribution of respect and of cultural and material goods. 
Above all, it would help to support and protect them. If these are subjects 
who are conventionally seen as radically excluded, for example as 
beyond the possibility of communication or as embodied in ways  which 
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occasion aversion or anxiety, the prize work should attempt to disrupt  
those violence-prone perceptions.   
 
One of my nominations for such a prize would be the film Babe. Before 
seeing the film, I would have doubted that it was possible to make a  
highly successful film for mass audiences that could do those things for 
one of the most oppressed subjects in our society, the meat pig.  One 
feature that made this achievement possible was that the film 
successfully disrupted the adult/child boundary and created space for 
adults to share certain kinds of openness to and sympathy for animals, 
permitted to children but normally out of bounds for mature adults. This 
is one of the devices which enables the film, like Dick King-Smith's 
prize-winning book The Sheep-Pig on which it is based1, to succeed to a 
remarkable degree in opening for the pig the 'unprejudiced heart' invoked 
in the narrator's opening sentence. It is not just the film's 
problematisation of the concept of meat that makes this film 
philosophically interesting; it also poses many ethico-political questions,  
analogous to questions  in post-colonial theory, about the distinction 
between meat and non-meat animals and the role of the human contract 
with those special more privileged 'pet' animals who can never be 'meat'. 
 
Because the main theme of Babe  turns around the refusal of 
communicative status to animals, the film is of considerable interest for 
philosophical accounts of human-animal relations.  The story provides a 
rich context for thinking about this communicative status, about the 
inadequacy of narrow rationalist accounts of communication, about 
representations of animal communication and the charge of 
anthropomorphism, and about the contradictions and paradoxes 
disclosed when we recognise the meat as a communicative subject. Babe 
repeatedly problematises the kind of prejudice that relegates the other 
that is our food to the category of 'meat', a sphere of radical otherness 
marked by  rational  deficiency, reduction to an impoverished, 
mechanistic concept of 'body',  and exclusion from communicative 
status. The pig Babe soon talks his way smartly around the assumption 
that  because he is a meat animal, he is 'too stupid to understand'; the 
storyline refutes the sheep-dog Fly's dismissal of  sheep-talk as 'just so 
much rubbish, to which she never paid any attention'. The refusal of 
communicative status to animals is a crucial,  formative arena where 
radical exclusion and silencing strategies which affect both humans and 
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animals are developed and perfected. Babe  thus provides many insights 
into closure strategies  as they affect both humans and nonhumans.  
 
Babe also offers a recognition of communicative virtues and 
characteristics as central to both human and nonhuman forms of life, and 
offers a vision of the emergence of communicative forms of relationship 
as victorious alternatives to forms based on violence, domination and 
terror. The film does not explore the ethical and political ambiguities of 
communicative forms, which are potentially rather more compatible with 
oppression than it suggests, and are implicated in the replacement of  
repressive patriarchal models by hegemonic models based on the master 
subject, as in certain forms of liberal democratic politics for example. 
But as Dryzek2  and Plumwood3 have argued, communicative models of 
relationships with nature and animals seem likely to offer us a better 
chance of survival in the difficult  times ahead than dominant 
mechanistic models which promote insensitivity to the others' agency 
and denial of our dependency on them. Babe  crystallises in a useful way 
a clash of models that is critical for our times.  
   
My initial reason for going to the movie however had less to do with 
millennial models and more to do with being homesick -- I was away 
from Australia for a long period and the film had been shot in a shire 
near my home. I hoped to hear again the sounds of the bush -- those 
small but intensely evocative background calls -- especially the local 
birds and frogs which appear in the background on most soundtracks --
that creep up on you unawares to create powerful  longings for a  much-
loved  place.  But when I took my seat in the darkened cinema, 
something else made me cry too, with sorrow and shame for my own 
complicity in the dominant cultural tradition of rational human mastery 
over animals and nature -- as well as everything else considered beneath 
the master realm of reason.  These were the powerful opening scenes of 
Babe showing the terrible cruelty of the intensive pig farms in which the 
pig Babe, treated as living meat, is  introduced  to us as narrative subject.  
 
These visions of hell  took on special power and poignancy for me 
because at the time I saw the film, I was living in the second highest  
U.S. state for intensive hog production. The state of North Carolina was 
a place where one rarely saw farm animals out in the open and many of 
the rivers and estuaries were seriously degraded or under assault from 
the toxic run-off generated by the intensive factory farms. Many of the  
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huge pig 'slaughter facilities' in the U.S. employ largely  prison labour. 
The work of those who labour on the killing floor of these massive 
facilities slaughtering up to 15,000 pigs a day is so terrible and poorly 
paid  that only the slave-like workforce of the carceral system, or those 
coerced by other forms of desperation such as  indentured immigrants, 
are available as workers.  The concentration camps too employed some 
categories of prisoners to organise, imprison  and execute others. The 
treatment of the pigs and that of the prisoners has much in common; in 
both cases, the intense segregation of the gulag ensures that the middle 
class rarely has to confront the hidden connection between its ugly and 
violent reality and their own comfortable and tidy lives. The speech of 
both pigs and prisoners is erased or delegitimated, and both are reduced 
to living meat. As C. Stone Brown argues, 'African Americans are the 
flesh that maintains a profitable "prison industry".'4 As disciplinary 
democracy normalises massive incarceration and more of us become 
either prisoners or keepers, the fate of nonhuman and human prisoners 
increasingly converges.    
 
The nightmarish opening scenes of Babe  showed an ugly gulag reality 
that was all around but which was banished from thought and sight, and 
generally treated, even by the animal liberation movement, as too well 
established for serious contest. In these circumstances, who could  avoid 
being immediately caught up in the little pig's plight, or avoid comparing 
the misery of the incarcerated animals with the consumptive pleasures of 
the over-privileged humans the next shots cut to?   The filmic technique 
at this point had us crossing that crucial animal/human subject boundary 
with dizzying speed, so fast that our usual distancing defences did not 
have time to cut in and tell us that these subjects are not at all 
comparable, that humans count and pigs don't. Who could avoid 
comparing the pigs' misery with the humans' pleasure, or avoid thoughts 
of concentration camps and gas chambers as the pig mothers were torn 
from their children and cattle-prodded into that  terrible night journey 
from which there was no return?  
 
The answer, of course, to this question is: 'quite a lot of people'. Many 
people didn't see  animals or animal liberation as the topic of the film, 
and some reviewers seemed to think it was all about how you could cross 
gender and class boundaries and burst categories to make yourself 
anything you wanted to be, even a sheep-pig, if you had enough  
determination and willpower. For them it was a sophisticated 
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postmodern-neoliberal Animal Farm allegory about personal 
responsibility, individual merit rewarded, and trying harder. Babe  does 
have valid things to say to a human audience about not staying in the 
boxes convention puts you into, but the message here is also relevant to 
breaking down hierarchies of considerability which serve to confine 
nonhumans. Some were open to such a metaphorical message about 
stereotyping and limitation in the human case, but closed to it in the 
nonhuman case. Their inability  to see how animals themselves could be 
more than conceptual instruments for humans and could themselves be a 
topic for a 'serious' film points to their entrapment by a conceptual 
framework that assigns animals a status beneath subjectivity and 
seriousness. Both assignments are effective defences against hearing the 
story of the speaking meat that Babe  articulates. The pig Babe speaks 
from the most delegitimated subject position possible in our society,  that 
of the meat,  and we have developed strategies for blocking out and not 
hearing the speech of those in that position. We could not continue the 
sorts of meat practices the pig-human gulag system is based upon 
without these kinds of strategies.  One of the great strengths of the film is 
that it invites us to challenge some of these paradoxes,  blocks and 
erasures.  
  
2: The Paradox of the Speaking Meat  
In the opening scenes of the factory farm we are introduced to the piglet 
Babe as the film's main narrative subject (marked by the subject's theme 
on the soundtrack, among other marks of subjecthood). We open with a 
shot showing real piglets waking in expressive communication, and then 
see one of these meat-subjects expressing his/her5 sorrow at the loss of 
his mother, and his fear as he is seized by strangers and carried away to 
be raffled. As his mother is prodded into the truck, Babe utters his grief 
so fleetingly and naturally that we hardly notice that our usual 
assumptions have been turned on their heads. The meat animal is being 
presented to us as an expressive, narrative subject -- the meat is 
speaking. There are several disruptions here.  What is disrupted 
immediately is the Cartesian stereotype of the machine-animal, the 
dominant model which enables the ontological presence,  mindlike and 
communicative characteristics of animals to be so utterly denied in the 
factory farm, where their entire lives are defined and distorted by the 
function of serving human appetite. There is paradox in the concept of 
speaking meat Babe confronts us with, precisely because the concept of 
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meat totally erases that speaking position; there is no possibility of 
encountering the meat  as expressive, narrative subject. 
 
An inquiry into the concept of meat provides a useful route into 
understanding how  'taxonomy' connects ontology with ethics -- how 
certain strategies of representation normalise oppression by narrowing 
ethically relevant perception, erasing key ethical dimensions of 
situations, and sometimes  even  making the other complicit in their own 
oppression through internalising oppressive forms of identity. As Carol 
Adams has argued6, the concept of meat justifies oppression by hiding 
responsibility for death and the causal connection between the 
production of meat and the animal's death. The backgrounding, erasure 
or denial of these connections in the abstractly quantitative and 
commodified concept of meat Adams terms 'absent referent'. 'Absent 
referent' involves a complex process of splitting which renders 
unavailable not only the act of killing which makes meat available as a 
commodity6, but any recognition of connection between the meat and 
those who consume it.  To achieve this the concept of meat must 
simultaneously establish several profound splits or radical exclusions,  
between process-product, mind-body, and us-them. The first of these is 
inherent in the commodity form and involves a radical dissociation 
which denies the connection between the processes set in motion by our 
intentions and the end product of commodified,  quantitatively-
specifiable flesh. The second radically dissociates the subjectivity which 
sets these processes in motion from that of its victim, denying their 
kinship as socially connected, purposive and communicative beings, and 
presenting the victim reductively as flesh. 'You looks at us' says King-
Smith's wise old sheep Maa 'and you sees lamb chops'.   
 
The third background assumption involved in modern industrial society's 
concept of meat as commodity denies the possibility of human 
consumers themselves ever taking the form of meat,  by a background 
assumption of a hierarchy of use and considerability which is linked to 
an alleged hierarchy of mental and communicative capacities between 
species, with humans of course at the top. We may daily consume other 
animals in their billions, but we never position ourselves reciprocally as 
food for these others, not even worms.  As consumers of meat who can 
never suppose ourselves be meat, we assume the god-position above the 
action, positioning our identity outside the framework of ecological 
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exchange. The conjunction 'human meat' becomes almost as unthinkable 
a possibility as the idea of being  introduced to the speaking meat. 
 
The concept of meat is a form of life7 in which taxonomy structures our 
moral vision via the ethical and epistemological possibilities it discloses 
or denies.8 These sets of background denials enable the presentation of 
the other in the instrumental terms that Marilyn Frye has identified as 
belonging to the arrogant perspective in which viewers 'organise 
everything seen with reference to themselves and their own interests',9 in 
this case, in terms of a strong  instrumental reductionism which identifies 
the other with what is only a part of their being, the part that  is of use to 
us as flesh. Since eurocentric culture identifies the human in radically 
contrasting terms which emphasise, rather than suppress or deny we, in 
contrast, are identified as humans in terms which emphasise, rather than 
suppress or deny, our subjectivity, and which tend to background our 
bodily aspects of identity, beings identified as meat become radically 
Other: not only can we never be included in the category of meat 
ourselves, we  can never  be introduced to the meat. These assumptions 
together involve a profound and multiple denial of kinship with meat.   
 
There is injustice in each of  these  denials and reductive modes of 
conception. There is injustice for a communicative and ethical being in 
being conceived systematically in ways that refuse recognition of this 
status and these characteristics. There is injustice for such a being in 
being conceived reductively as body, first because such conception 
singles its referent out for treatment as radically less than it is, and 
second because such an instrumental reductionism defines the other in 
terms that assume  the right of a  'higher' group supposedly above the 
process of exchange  to treat them as a resource for their ends. Animals 
so conceived are subject to both radical exclusion (as having a radically 
different nature discontinuous from that of the human meat consumer) 
and extreme homogenisation -- replaceable and interchangeable, their 
individuality submerged, they 'drown in the anonymous collectivity' of 
the quantitative commodity form meat. The radical exclusion aspect of 
the meat concept denies kinship and generates a conceptual distance or 
boundary between humanity and its 'meat' which blocks sympathy, 
reduces the risk of identification with those so designated, and silences 
them as communicative beings. The reductiveness of the meat concept 
permits a conceptual strategy designed to block recognition of these 
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injustices, and its disruption in the concept of  the speaking meat is one 
source of the flavour of paradox  that lingers around  that idea.   
 
But from the injustice of industrial society's institution of meat as 
commodity, and the moral cowardice and evasion of the associated 
conceptual strategies of denial, we cannot conclude that there is no moral 
alternative to a universalised vegetarianism, that there are no other, less 
ethically problematic ways to resolve the tensions between conceiving 
nonhumans both as communicative others and as food. In the complex 
biological exchange which sustains all our lives, we must all gain 
sustenance at the expense of the other, 'the one living the other's death, 
and dying the other's life', in the words of Heraclitus. Shagbark Hickory 
outlines an alternative, non-reductive  perspective on this exchange 
which does not refuse the moral complexities and perplexities involved:  
 
 For most or all American Indians food (plant as well as 
 animal) is kin. Relationships to plants and animals as, on 
 the one hand, food and, on the other hand, kin creates a 
 tension which is dealt with mythically, ritually, and 
 ceremonially, but which is never denied. It is this  refusal to 
deny the dilemma in which we are  implicated in this life, a 
refusal to take the way of bad faith,  moral supremacy, or self-
deception which constitutes a  radical challenge to our 
relationships to our food. The  American Indian view that 
considerability goes "all the way  down" requires a response 
considerably more sophisticated  than those we have seen in 
the West, which consist either in  drawing lines of moral 
considerability in order to create an  out-group, or in constructing 
hierarchies of considerability  creating de facto  out-groups in 
particular cases.10 
 
As Shagbark Hickory notes, some forms of vegetarianism remain trapped 
in the Western strategies of denial and radical exclusion which create 
further out-groups,  merely redrawing the boundary of otherness in a 
different place, at the border of animality rather than humanity. This 
comes about because, as we notice, the dominant Western view places 
humans above the systematic exchange processes in which all creatures 
become (eventually) food for others, privileging humans as eaters for 
whom all others are available as food but who are never themselves 
available as food. Some movements toward recognition of kinship 
between humans and animals thus take the misguided form of attempting 
to extend the privilege of this problematic positioning of humans above 
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the exchange process outward to other (selected) groups of animals. At 
the same time, such forms of recognition are of necessity highly limited 
in the class to which such recognition can be extended. They can only 
result in enlarging the class of the privileged, instead of a recognition of 
the kinship of all living things in the biological exchanges of food, and 
in a retention of the strategies of erasure and denial for the excluded 
groups.  
 
In contrast, the indigenous recognition that the central philosophical 
problem of human life is that 'all our food is souls' points towards non-
reductive practices and understandings of food that  resolve the moral 
failings  of 'bad faith, moral supremacy, [and] self-deception' Shagbark 
Hickory finds implicit in the dominant Western meat concept. However, 
to the extent that these alternative understandings of food form part of a 
different 'form of life', in Wittgenstein's sense11, they are not readily 
available, either practically or conceptually,  within the context of 
contemporary industrial life and its  commodified food relationships. 
Conversely, the fact that vegetarianism may usually be the course which, 
in the context of such a commodity society, will best minimise our 
complicity in injustice towards others, does nothing to support the 
eurocentric conclusion that vegetarianism is a universal  moral 
requirement for all people in all societies in all situations.12  
 
In contexts where the multiple denials of kinship involved in meat 
cannot be successfully made, for example in the case where we have 
'been introduced' and have intimate and individual knowledge of the 
particular animal to be eaten, we tend to experience powerful tensions 
and often profound discomforts over its inclusion in the category of 
meat. These tensions and discomforts find expression in traditional 
contexts such as New Guinea, where pigs that have been raised as part of 
a family are never slaughtered by that family but are exchanged. 
Alternative Westerners (for example, subsistence farmers) who aim to 
create 'spiritual' food practices in opposition to the dominant 
commodified ones sometimes argue that meat eating is ethically 
acceptable if you 'take responsibility'. This phrase I think indicates a 
search for alternative food practices that avoid the processes of ethical 
erasure I have identified in the practices of meat. 
 
In a Western context of individualised ethical choice, such alternatives 
would have to mean, for example, the eater taking personal responsibility 
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for the eaten animal's fate (which in the case of a domestic animal would 
include responsibility for the quality of its life as well as for its death), 
and bearing the blame for unnecessary suffering. That would mean 
finding ways to acknowledge fully the animal's 'soul' and its kinship, and 
to express gratitude and reciprocity, that is, to acknowledge a reciprocal 
availabiltiy as food for others. Such conditions, demanding even in the 
context of traditional communities, are very difficult to realise, both 
materially and psychologically, in the context of contemporary urban 
Western life. To the extent that they require establishing new shared 
cultural practices and meanings rather than just new individual practices, 
ethically sensitive carnivorous practices are not culturally available in 
that context.  
 
The paradox of the speaking meat is both the product of  a particular 
social context, and an indicator of some of the most significant moral 
failings of that context. The western solution to the moral dilemmas of 
food is the creation of a set of moral dualisms, involving a sharp 
discontinuity between those who deserve and those who are beyond 
ethical consideration. As we have seen, the speaking meat forces us to 
confront the way this moral dualism and discontinuity is based on 
reductionism, denial and silencing.  Our civilisation's orientation to the 
creation of moral dualisms may be one reason for its technological 
dominance, since it removes any constraints of respect which might 
otherwise hold back development, but it remains an ever ready source of 
corruption of our ethical practices. The silencing solutions of  moral 
dualism are always potentially capable of extension  to selected groups 
of humans counted as lesser in their humanity, and we have seen this 
extension made many times in this century. Although this silencing 
possibility is present in any human society,  it must be greatly reinforced 
by  the entrenchment of the dualist model in the basic case of food.  
 
3 : The Communicative Model  
The overarching model which subsumes the commodity model of the 
animal and its specific modes of and motives for reduction is the 
Cartesian-mechanistic reduction of the non-human animal to its body, 
and the associated refusal to recognise non-human animals as akin to 
human ones in the possession of mind, intention and communication. 
Mary Midgley13  and Barbara Noske14 are two philosophers who have 
pointed out that the moral failings implicit in the modern,  commodified 
concept of meat find their philosophical progenitor in Cartesian  
 31 
rationalism and the mechanistic model. The rationalist-mechanistic 
model of the animal is a key part of  the relation between modernity and 
the nonhuman world, and its rationality is expressed both in reductive 
concepts like meat and in the practices of the factory farm.14 The 
mechanistic model erases the possibility of communication by denying 
mindlike properties to non-humans; ideals of manipulation and 
instrumental rationality are at odds with communicative ideals and with 
the conception of the other as a communicative subject. Babe  confronts 
us with the conflict between the mechanistic model of the factory farm, 
and the communicative model of human/animal relations the film 
ultimately vindicates. This alternative communicative model is located in 
the film in the romantically presented contrast space of the Hoggett's 
family farm, where it struggles to emerge in the unconventional role 
tolerated for the former meat animal Babe and Babe's communicative 
reformation of relationships with the sheep. But the farm itself is the site 
of conflict between the communicative and the Cartesian-reductive 
models, for it too contains the sinister meat house and the animal regimes 
based on fear and force. The conflict between these models is also 
represented in the form of the conflict within the taciturn farmer and 
between him and the more conventional  farm wife.  
 
Nevertheless, animal liberationists have some justification for viewing 
the film's major implicit contrast between the factory farm and the family 
farm with a sceptical eye. To say that the family farm setting of Babe  is 
highly romanticised is an understatement. A cynic might say that the 
family farm parallels the family as the site of mystifying  representations 
and idealisations. The contrasts of Babe  hide the fact that the family 
farm model is compatible with, and normally involves, many oppressive 
animal husbandry practices;  the destination of most of its animal food-
producing units is ultimately the market, and all that has changed is the 
indoor setting. This would be, I think, to ignore the fact that moral 
differences of degree can be important; it would be like saying that there 
is no moral difference between being a worker on a production line and 
an inmate of a concentration camp, because both involve some degree of 
reduction and instrumentalisation. If there is a moral difference between 
the smaller scale farm and the animal gulag,  however, there is also 
normally a lot more continuity than Babe  makes visible.  
 
But to dismiss the implicit contrast of Babe  in this way  would be to 
miss the point that Babe  also makes visible a new possibility - the 
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possibility of replacing a dominant model of mechanistic relations by a 
communicative one which recognises the animal's status as a 
communicative and moral being and revolutionises the moral basis of 
relationships with domestic animals. Whether this is compatible with 
farming as we know it remains an open question, but one the film 
deserves credit  for raising.  Babe  leaves us in no doubt that meat is 
violence, and it posits a model of communication in opposition to that  
violence, and hence a new vision of relations to domestic animals. It 
does not explore the puzzles in that vision, leaving us with various 
paradoxes to chew on. But its communicative model presents a final 
vision of some power, including the triumph of the communicative skills 
and ethic Babe has acquired from the maternal wisdom of the sheep and 
various other proxy mothers.  
 
Babe's status as a communicative subject has received so little attention 
in the monstrous regime of the gulag that  he does not even have an 
individual name. But, as we soon discover when Babe is removed 
through the device of  the raffle to the relatively enlightened  world of 
the family farm, Babe's status as a communicative subject still has many 
obstacles to overcome to gain recognition. Before arrival at the farm, 
Babe is initially just a 'worthless little runt', an object to be weighed, 
raffled off and eaten. In the idealised world of the Hoggett's traditional 
farm, Babe's communicative capacities are  initially dimly, then more 
clearly, recognised by Farmer Hoggett. But they are not initially 
recognised by his wife,  who addresses him as 'you lucky little pork chop' 
and looks forward to Babe's transformation into the familiar commodity 
form of 'two nice hams, two sides of bacon, pork chops, kidneys, liver, 
chitterling, trotters etc'.  
 
The film version of Mrs. Hoggett, unlike the book version,  is made to 
represent the most closed, convention and consumer-bound side of the 
human character.15 Although this elaboration of conflicting perspectives 
adds some richness to the film's themes and characterisation, the linking 
of the conflict  between the mechanistic and communicative perspectives 
in this way with gender introduces elements of androcentrism into the 
story, obscures the real connections between gender and consumerism 
and between gender and the mechanistic model,16 and generates 
contradictory messages about the affirmation of animality. This emerges 
in the film's derogatory representation of  the farm wife in animalistic 
terms and in the implicit demeaning of  women's understanding and tasks 
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as consumeristic and materialistic, in contrast to the more 'spiritual' 
orientation of the father/farmer.  Babe's subjectivity is recognised by 
several animal foster mothers, the dog Fly and the sheep Maa, who 
develop Babe's communicative and social abilities in the best maternal 
traditions. But although Babe's unusual communicative abilities must 
ultimately derive from these various mothers (who must have included 
the original pig mother he missed so much), it is their completion and 
recognition by the father/farmer, represented as the 'unprejudiced heart', 
that are positioned in the movie as the key transformative elements for 
Babe and for the culture more generally.    
 
The farmer is, for reasons the film leaves unexplored, open to certain 
possibilities of animal communication the others around him are closed 
to. By various communicative deeds, Babe gradually earns the farmer's 
recognition of his subjectivity, or so he believes, but is devastated by the 
final -- incredible -- discovery of his status as meat, revealed to him by  
the jealous cat.  This apparent betrayal, (of almost biblical proportions) 
by the father, almost kills Babe, who, like the duck Ferdie, cannot bear to 
live as only meat. At this point in the story, as at the beginning and the 
end, Babe is positioned as a Christ figure, the feminised, dependent son 
who is affirmed and revived by the farmer/father's recognition and love, 
expressed in the dance of life. Together Babe and the farmer go on to 
accomplish the apparently impossible feat of opening closed minds and 
demonstrating Babe's unrecognised communicative ability to the world. 
We are invited to conclude that this revolutionises the treatment of pigs 
and of farming generally,  reformulating it as an activity based on 
communication rather than force and violence.  The communicative ethic 
is also strongly represented by the (female) sheep, whose persistent faith 
in and exemplification of the virtues and values of communication and 
non-violence is essential to their ultimate victory over the reductive 
violence of traditional relationships.  
 
Communicative relationships open up new moral possibilities for 
organising life in ways that can negotiate conflicts of interests,  build 
agreement, trust and mutuality, and avoid instrumentalism and the 
imposition of the will of one party on the other by force. Communicative 
relations don't necessarily follow out those possibilities  however, and it 
is important not to romanticise the communicative model, which does 
not automatically eliminate the dynamic of power, either in terms of 
equality of access, of hierarchy in forms of communication, or of the 
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structuring  of communication in hegemonic ways. There are various  
strategies for taking back the greater equality communicative models 
appear to offer. Rationalist models which treat communication as an 
exercise in pure, abstract, neutral and universal reason, and which 
delegitimate the more  emotional and bodily forms and aspects of 
communication,  operate to exclude nonhumans from full communicative 
status just as they exclude various human others accorded lower human 
status as further from the rational ideal. These rationalist models exclude 
the forms of communication associated with animals along with the 
forms of communication associated with women, with non-western 
cultures and with less 'educated' classes.17  
 
Communicative models which allow us to overcome these exclusions for 
humans will also help us to recognise non-human animals in their denied 
aspects as communicative beings, but an excessive emphasis on 
communication and its use as a criterion of moral worth or value would 
remain problematic for nonhumans in basing itself on a capacity which 
may still be  highly characteristic of humanity, and in biasing our 
valuations heavily towards those species most similar to ourselves. To 
overcome this implicit anthrocentrism, a communicative model would 
need to be part of plural set of grounds for valuation,  rather than its 
unique and exclusive basis, and to be sensitive to communicative 
capacities within species as well as to their capacities for communication 
with humans.  
 
If the film's communicative vision offers hope of moving on to a new 
stage beyond mechanism, it also leaves us with many tantalising 
questions about this new stage which arise from the ambivalence of 
communication. Will communication be on our terms or theirs? Will 
Babe's communicative abilities be used  for the good of the animals or 
for that of the farmer? If the film's account of the moral development of 
the farmer (reaching its climax in the step-dance) offers a vision of the 
small farm as a putative future enterprise of love and communication 
with nature and animals,  the film also casts little light on the question of 
what the communicative farm would be like. Will the new 
communicative paradigm be used to liberate the sheep and the other farm 
animals, or merely to oppress them in more subtle and self-complicit 
ways?  Will the communicative animal farm stand to the mechanistic 
farm as the hegemonic communicative forms of liberal democracy stand 
to the more repressive  forms of patriarchal-authoritarian governance 
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they replaced?  The distinction between democracy and despotism is 
supposedly built on such a contrast, but as it becomes increasingly clear 
how little our own society resembles the democratic ideal  of free and 
open dialogue to which all have access, it also becomes clear how our 
communicative abilities can be used to control and imprison us. A new 
communicative stage of human-nature relationships would need to place 
such questions at the centre of its critical thought: at this level, the tale of 
the speaking meat  has only just begun.   
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